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RECENT CASES
though the Todd case permitted retroactive application and
did not protect the "right," the Swank case denied retroactive
application and granted the protection. Yet the majority in
the Swank case expressly allowed the Todd decision to stand."
Confusion must follow too from allowing the Declaratory
Theory to remain, in name, as a principle of Indiana law
while creating an exception so large and ill-defined that
accurate prediction of future decisions becomes impossible
and the principle becomes, in truth, no longer controlling.
Either rigid adherence to the Declaratory Theory as it has
long been understood, or complete abandonment of it would
have satisfied the need for reasonable certainty in the law.
If the Supreme Court feels that the time has come to reject
as unreal a theory founded upon Blackstonian concepts of
law, a frank decision to that effect seems preferable to a
resort to the vagueness of words.36
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
EFFECT OF STATUTORY LIMITATION OF TERM
OF OFFICE CREATED BY LEGISLATURE
Hessler, the trustee-elect of Center Township, Vander-
burgh County, Indiana, died before qualifying and taking
the oath of office. Karger, the incumbent trustee, had
served in office for eight consecutive years. The statutes
provide that "no person shall be eligible to hold the office
of township trustee for more than eight years in any period
of twelve years."' The Board of County Commissioners
passed a resolution finding Karger ineligible to continue in
office because he had served the statutory maximum. The
Board proceeded to find that a vacancy existed and appointed
Fares to the office.2  Upon the refusal of Karger to sur-
and the ability to vote were the only qualifications. The court
in the Todd case held that the "Lawyer Amendment" had been
passed. Certainly the voters had the right to have their votes
counted in accordance with the existing law in the Todd case
if they had that right in the Swank case.
35. Swank v. Tyndall, 78 N. E.2d 535, 541 (Ind. 1948).
36. A subsequent case indicates that the Swank case will be used
merely to exemplify the Declaratory Theory. State v. Burch, 80
N. E.2d 294 (Ind. 1948).
1. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1943) § 65-101.
2. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns RepI. 1943) § 65-106 provides that all
vacancies in the office of township trustee "shall" be filled by
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render his office, Fares brought an action in the nature of
a quo wtrranto. The Indiana Supreme Court held that
Karger is entitled to the office although he has served eight
years. The statutory limitation to eight years means only
that an incumbent, here Karger, is ineligible for subsequent
election to the office, but he is entitled to continue in office
as a hold-over. In reaching this result, the court relied
upon a provision of the Indiana Constitution, which pro-
vides: "Whenever it is provided in this Constitution, or in
any law which may be hereafter passed, that any officer...
shall hold his office for any given term, the same shall be
construed to mean, that such officer shall hold his office for
such terni, and until his successor shall have been elected
and qualified."" State ex rel. Fares v. Karger, 77 N. E.2d
746 (Ind. 1948).
Faced with a fact situation to which a constitutional
provision creating hold-over tenure and an apparently con-
flicting statute prohibiting tenure beyond eight years seemed
equally applicable, the court had several courses of action.
It might have refused to reconcile the two provisions and
have held the statute ineffective because it conflicted with
the constitution. It might have construed the constitution
and the statute together and, by limiting the broad language
of the constitution, have held that that language was appli-
cable only to situations where an incumbent was not other-
wise rendered ineligible to continue in office, and hence
that it was inapplicable here. Or by limiting the meaning
of the statutory words "eligible to the office" to mean
"eligible to election to the office," the court might have held
the statute inapplicable here, since Karger was not to continue
in office by virtue of an election. The court chose the last
of these possibilities, limited the statute's meaning and gave
broad effect to words of the constitution. A township trus-
tee, it held, is entitled as a matter of right to hold over until,
his successor is elected and qualified, even though that frus-
the Board of Commissioners of the county, and the appointee
shall servie until his successor is elected and qualified. The section
further provides that it shall be the duty of the County Auditor
'to call a special session of the board without delay to fill a
vacancy if the board is not in session at the time the vacancy
occurs.
3. IND. CONST. Art. IX, § 3.
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tee would not be eligible for re-election under the terms
of the statute which creates the office.
The present case, in permitting hold-over tenure by an
officeholder whose office was created and whose tenure was
limited by statute, has given new life to a long-standing dis-
tinction in Indiana law, a distinction some commentators
have thought dead.4  For, while the constitution permits
holding over in an office created by statute, in an office cre-
ated by the constitution no holding over is allowed after the
maximum term specified by the constitution has been served.
In 1885, the Indiana Supreme Court held in the case of Gos-
man v. State ex rel. Schumacher5 that a circuit court clerk
whose office was created and whose tenure was limited by a
constitutional provision was absolutely ineligible to hold office
beyond the maximum period specified by that constitutional
provision. The constitutional provision with regard to hold-
over tenure was gven no effect.6 In 1891 in State ex rel.
Reese v. Bogard7 the court held that a township trustee,
whose office was created and whose maximum tenure was
limited by statute, was eligible to hold over when his suc-
cessor had failed to qualify. The court stated that "It was
the purpose of the Legislature to prevent an elector from
holding by election a new and additional term of four years
4. Robert C. Brown, Indianapolis Mayoralty Cases, 4 IND. L. J. 194
(1928), stated that "The Indiana rule, which follows the weight
of authority, is that there is no vacancy in an office until the
person chosen as successor qualifies, even though the term of
office of the incumbent is limited by statutory or constitutional
provisions .... ." In the note citing authority for this proposition
Mr. Brown states that the "Gosman case (decided in 1885) is
hard to reconcile with this doctrine but is of doubtful authority
now." He then cites the Bogard case which was decided in 1891.
He failed to inform the reader that when the question of a con-
stitutional limitation was again brought before the court in Aik-
man v. State ex rel. Wadsworth, 152 Ind. 836, 53 N. E. 563 (1899),
the Gosman case was followed despite the decision of the Bogard
case involving a statutory office and limitation. The Aikman
case involved the constitutionally-created office of County Treas-
urer.
5. 106 Ind. 203, 6 N. E. 349 (1885).
6. The same result was reached in the later case of Aikman v. State
ex. Tel. Wadsworth, 152 Ind. 836, 53 N. E. 563 (1889), which
involved the constitutional office of County Treasurer. Cf. Scott
v. State ex. Tel. Gibbs, 151 Ind. 556, 52 N. E. 563 (1889), where
under the same circumstances as the Aikman case an incumbent
Treasurer who had not served for four consecutive years was per-
mitted to hold over.
7.- 128 Ind. 480, 27 N. E. 1113 (1891).
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after having held the office for two consecutive terms."8 It
gave full effect, as in the instant case, to the hold-over pro-
vision of the constitution and allowed the incumbent to re-
main in office. Although this distinction between offices
created and defined by the constitution and those created
and defined by statute carries with it the authority of long
acceptance, it is desirable to re-examine it in an attempt to
determine whether it also carries the greater authority of
some foundation in fact or reason.
The framers of our constitution evidently felt that the
public interest would best be served by limiting the number
of consecutive years that one person could hold certain
designated offices. Therefore, the constitution in certain
instances where it creates an office, definitely limits the
period which one man may serve.9 The General Assembly
when creating offices, follows this practice.1 Statutes which
create and limit their tenure use language identical to that
found in the constitution in limiting tenure in office: "No
person shall be eligible to the office of . . . more than . . .
years in any period of ... years."" This identity of wording
is a strong argument that the same policy considerations
which guided the framers of the constitution were influential
with the legislators and prompted the General Assembly to
place limitations on statutory offices. If the legislature
used the identical words for identical reasons, it surely in-
tended that an identical interpretation be placed on the
statutory limitations as is placed on c6nstitutional ones.' 2
8. Id. at 482, 27 N. E. at 1114.
9. See, e.g., Art. V., § 1, creating and limiting the tenure of the
office of Governor; Art. VI, § 1, creating, and limiting the tenuife
of office of, the offices of Secretary, Auditor, and Treasurer of
State.
10. The General Assembly is granted the authority by the constitu-
tion to create additional offices. IND. CONST. Art. VI, § 3. Might
it not also be argued that the power to create also carries with
it an implied power to place limitations on an office and that suchlimitations have the same efficacy as if the office and the
limitation had been provided for in the constitution?
11. IND. CONST. Art. VI, § 2; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1943)
§ 65-101.
12. The statutory limitation involved in the Bogard case was passed
after the decision in the Gosman case. It may be justifiably as-
sumed that when the General Assembly used the identical wording
of Art XV, § 3 of the constitution (which had been interpreted
in the Gosman case as creating an absolute ineligibility to hold




The foregoing argument for uniform interpretation is
based upon an intent of the legislators as disclosed by the
language of the statutes themselves. Examination of the
words of the constitution too discloses that its framers must
have intended that limitations imposed by the constitution
and by statutes be given the same meaning. The constitu-
tional provision in providing for holding over reads: "When-
ever it is provided in this constitution, or in any law which
may be hereafter passed, that any-officer . . . etc."113 It
seems unnecessary to spell out an intent that the provision
be applied uniformly to offices created by the constitution
and to those created by statute. Yet it is this very provision
which has been applied differently by the court, and which
is responsible for the present distinction between statutory
and constitutional offices.
It is at least arguable that the constitutional provision1 4
creating hold-over terms means that an incumbent may hold
over only if he is eligible to hold office according to the terms
of eligibility set out by the authority creating the office.
Under this interpretation it may be said that one can hold
over in an office only if he has not served the maximum
period permitted, and this should be true with equal force
whether that maximum is defined by the constitution or by
statute. In allowing the authority creating an office to fix
the requirements for eligibility to it, this interpretation is
entirely consonant with the language and the spirit of the
constitutional provision under discussion. In sum, the
language, both of the Constitution and of the relevant stat-
utes, seems to demand that there be a single interpretation
of this section of the constitution. So much for legislative
intent.
Consideration of constitutional and statutory offices
reveals no significant factual basis for distinguishing ration-
ally between the two.
The court in the instant case, in holding that the con-
stitution gave Karger a right to continue in office despite
the limit imposed by the statute which created his office,
relied for its authority on numerous cases which state that
the constitutional hold-over provision adds an "additional,




contingent and defeasible term to the original fixed term."
But the cases cited by the court did not deal with the prob-
lem of an incumbent who had served for the maximum
number of years permitted by either a statute or the consti-
tution.15 Granting it was correct to hold that the constitu-
tion permitted a hold-over, in those prior cases, they are not
authority for an application of the same reasoning to this
entirely different fact situation; viz., where the incumbent
Karger had served the maximum number of years permitted
by statute.
If the constitutional and statutory limitations on the
number of years that one may serve in office, whatever
authority created that office, ought to be uniformly in-
terpreted in relation to the constitutional section dealing
with holding over in office, which of the two present inter-
pretations should prevail? If the "statutory office rule" is
the one adopted, the whole policy against protracted, and
consequently inefficient, office-holding will be overridden.
The ineptness of this rule is further demonstrated by its
effect in operation: it permits an incumbent office-holder
who would be ineligible for another term even though elected
by the people he is to serve, to be eligible to hold over because
his successor has failed to qualify.
15. State ex. rel. Jett v. Ives, 167 Ind. 13, 78 N. E. 225 (1906) dealt
with the holding over of a city councilman-an office having no
maximum limitation. Nor was there a maximum limitation on the
term of the member of a school board whose right to hold over
was litigated in Koerner v. State ex rel. Judy, 148 Ind. 158, 47
N. E. 323 (1897).
In State ex rel. Carson v. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434, 16 N. E.
384 (1888) the officer was to be elected by the General Assembly.
The General Assembly having failed to elect a new officer at the
prescribed time, the court held that the incumbent could hold over
under Art. XV, § 3 of the constitution. There was no vacancy
for the Governor to fill. This case would seem to stand for the
proposition that the expiration of a term of office does not in
itself create a vacancy that may be filled by the appointing
authority.
In State ex rel. Harrsion v. Menaugh, 151 Ind. 260, 51 N. E.
117 (1898) a "skip-election law" necessarily prevented a successor
to the incumbent from being elected. It was contended that the
law in effect gave the incumbent a 6-year term, which violated
Art. XV, § 2 of the constitution, which prohibits the Legislature
from creating any office the term of which is longer than four
years. In this case as well as in the case of Spencer v. Knight,
177 Ind. 564, 98 N. E. 342 (1912) it was held that a "skip-election
law" held over under Art. XV, § 3 of the constitution. In neither
case was the question of the incumbent's ineligibility because of
having served for the maximum period raised.
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But, if the interpretation that has been placed on cases
involving constitutional offices is adopted, what would seem
to be the true intent of the drafters of the constitution and
the statutes will be given expression. The words "eligible
to the office," seem to mean precisely that, i.e., "eligible to
hold office." Construction of "eligible to the office" to
mean "eligible by election to the office," which is the con-
struction adopted in the Bogard and in the instant cases, is
strained and seems unwarranted. Under the literal and
ordinary interpretation of the words, when an incumbent
had served for the maximum period, and his successor had
failed to qualify, a vacancy would exist to be filled by the
appointing authority. 6
LABOR LAW
AVAILABILITY OF LABOR INJUNCTION WHERE EM-
PLOYER FAILS TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS
OF INDIANA ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
A consent electioni held by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board determined Local No. 309, CIO, United Furni-
ture Workers of America, as the majority representative
of the employees of the Smith Cabinet Manufacturing Co.
The Smith Co. refused to recognize Local No. 309 until it
had been certified as the majority representative by the
NLRB.2 The refusal led to picketing with accompanying
violence. 3 The Company petitioned the Daviess County Cir-
16. See note 2 supra.
1. The consent election involved in the instant case was held a few
days prior to the effective date (August 22, 1947) of those sec-
tions of the Taft-Hartley Act making the filing of certain informa-
tion pre-requisite to the availability of services of the NLRB-
including the holding of elections-to labor unions, but no official
certification had been made before the Sections became effective.
2. The NLRB could not officially certify Local No. 309 because the
union refused to comply with filing requirements. No investiga-
tion of a question concerning the representation of employees,
raised by a labor organization, can be entertained by the Board
unless certain information concerning the organization has been
filed and kept up to date by annual reports, and the officers of
the organization have filed non-communist affidavits. 61 STAT.
143, 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 f, g, h (Supp. 1947).
3. State police were called in to restore order. It is interesting to
note in this connection the case of Local No. 309, United Furni-
ture Workers of America, CI0 v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N. D.
Ind. 1948). State police were attending union meetings held in
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